We consider a model of wage formation characterized by t wo features: learning and downward rigidity. We show that wages should exhibit a late beginner" property: controlling for the wage at date t, the wage at date t+1 should be negatively correlated with the wage at date t-1. We test this property o n a sample of about 1000 executives of a French state-owned rm whose careers we observe for 15 years. This organization exhibits the features that characterize internal labor markets; in particular, careers consist in sequences of discrete promotions, a fact that generates speci c econometric problems. The results con rm the prediction.
Introduction
The state of the art in modern contract theory presents us with a somewhat schizophrenic picture. Theoretical models have reached a high degree of sophistication; but at the same time, econometrics-based empirical investigation remains scarce. Although most theoretical models are initially motivated by some speci c features of actual contractual relationships, their empirical testing usually does not go beyond the description of a few stylized facts", that are shown to be explained by the particular model under study. But, of course, stylized facts in general t a numberof theories; the empirical con rmation they may bring therefore is somewhat weak. On the other hand, the numberof papers that aim at testing contract theory using actual data sets and standard econometric tools is surprisingly small. Many other elds in economics use a by now standard empirical approach: deriving, from alternative theoretical frameworks, con icting implications that can be contrasted with the help of adequate econometric techniques. But this approach has not yet left much mark on contract theory.
A possible explanation for this unsatisfactory situation lies in the nature of the data that are required for testing even basic models of contract theory. Most quantitative predictions of contract theory bear on the relationship between outcomes performances" and monetary transfers. In the case of labor contracts, di erent sets of assumptions about the information structure generate di erent conclusions about how wages depend on the worker's performance", as de ned by some adequate index. Models based on moral hazard, for instance, will typically predict that wages should be correlated with, though less volatile than, the worker's performance. Similarly, in an adverse selection setting, workers will face a menu of contracts. Those with higher ability will selfselect by c hoosing performance-related wage schedules, the latter thus being correlated with higher average performances.
In principle, such predictions are empirically testable. But very speci c databases are then necessary. A major source of di culty lies in the fact that, in many situations, performance, although observed by the employer, is not available to the econometrician. Assume, for instance, that the exact contribution of each single worker to total outcome cannot be directly quantied. The appraisal of the worker's e ort will then rely upon the evaluation of 1 the worker's supervisor. Such an information is qualitative b y essence, hence somewhat di cult to quantify precisely; moreover and more importantly, it is very rarely recorded. An important exception is Murphy's 1986 investigation of a longitudinal sample of 1488 chief executive o cers spanning more than 1000 rms. Murphy's idea is to use the rate of return on common stock as a measure of the executive's performance 1 . Within a multi-period setting, he derives dynamic consequences that contrast incentive and learning contracts. These consequences deal with the variations with experience of both the variance of earnings and the relationship between pay and performance. A similar approach can befound in Farber-Gibbons 1991 , where the authors focus on the dynamic consequences of a pure learning model. Here, the predictions drawn from the learning assumption concern the correlation through time between wages and proxies of ability.
In most cases, however, no evaluation of performances is available; datasets only contain information on wage or career pro les, plus a few worker-speci c characteristics age, training. . . . In such cases, the static predictions of the models can turn out to be quite di cult to test.
In order to overcome the lack of performance proxies, a natural solution is to turn to dynamics. The idea is to derive, from the various theoretical explanations at stake, di erent implications for the random process followed through time by w ages or promotions. For instance, wages may be linked to the last performance only; alternatively, they may, depending on the nature of the information asymmetry, take into account the whole history of the worker in the rm. Instead of focusing attention upon the usual, static relationship between compensation and performance|i.e., the way wages at date t depend on performances at the same period, we may, in other words, concentrate upon the dynamic relationship between wages|i.e., the way wages at time t depend on wages at time t , 1 and before. Our point is that, for empirical investigations of this kind, data on performances or individual outcomes are no longer necessary. What is needed is simply a record of wage pro les|plus, of course, a theoretical characterization of the dynamic properties of wages.
The main objective of this paper is to provide an illustration of this general research direction. We consider a general class of models, that includes several standard frameworks used in the literature. We derive a testable im-1 Of course, this performance proxy can only be considered for top executives. 2 plication of this general structure upon the form of wage dynamics. Finally, we test this prediction upon a sample of executives of a french state-owned rm, and nd it is not rejected.
The class of models we consider are characterized by two features :
the employer and the worker simultaneously learn about the latter's ability from the observation of his performances wages are downwards rigid.
From now on, we shall refer to this class as the LDR" for learning and downwards rigidity models. The class includes in particular the model of insurance and Bayesian learning proposed by Harris-Holmstrom 1982. In this framework, downward rigidity i s due to the fact that wage contracts are used to share the risk in an optimal way, under the constraint that the employee is always free to quit. An alternative explanation of wage rigidity relies upon incomplete contracting as in McLeod-Malcomson 1993 . Also, downward rigidity is a standard nding of the empirical literature on wage setting see, for instance, the recent study by Bewley 1997. Our test is based upon a characteristic property of wage dynamics that to the best of our knowledge has been overlooked so far, and that we call the late beginner e ect. Consider two w orkers who start from the same wage level at date 0 and receive exactly the same wage at date 2. However, they have followed a di erent path between dates 0 and 2. Worker A is an early starter, in the sense that her wage at date 1 is high, while B is a late beginner, with a lower salary at date 1. Which worker has the better prospects for future career? We show that, in the LDR framework, the answer is unambiguous, and somewhat surprising. In fact, B's odds are better than A's. In other words, if we control for the wage at date 2, then the wage at date 1 should be negatively correlated with future wages at date 3 and beyond. Not only is this feature interesting per se, but it exclusively concerns the time process followed by wages. As argued before, it can thus be tested even if performances have not been recorded.
The rest of the paper is precisely devoted to the construction and estimation of an econometric model aimed at testing this prediction. We believe that, as argued in Baker-Gibbs-Holmstrom 1994a, longitudinal monographic data relative to a given rm should be preferred, for this purpose, to cross-section samples gathering workers from many rms and involving all kinds of hierarchical levels. For this reason, we estimate the model on a dataset in which the careers of a panel of about 1000 executives o f a F rench state-owned rm are recorded for 15 years.
A characteristic of this rm is that it provides a typical example of an internal labor market. More than 95 of the sample still belongs to the rm after 16 years; conversely, e n try only takes place at the beginning of the career, except for a negligible number of highly speci c tasks. This feature, in our view, makes the data set particularly relevant for the study at stake. We believe that the LDR model is an especially accurate description of internal labor markets, if only because its oversimpli ed description of competition on the external labor market does not raise major problems in this case, as it would in a more open" type of organization.
However, using data from an internal labor market has some drawbacks that must betaken into account. A second contribution of the paper is precisely to indicate how the corresponding di culties can be adressed using standard econometric tools. The main problem is that within an internal labor market, wages are in general determined by the hierarchical level and seniority, according to some explicit formula that has generally been negotiated with unions. This horizontal equity" does not mean that payment cannot be used as incentives, but rather that promotions across levels should be seen as the appropriate index to appraise the link between compensation and performances|a point already emphasized by Holmstrom 1994b and Bewley 1997 . This means that, in the empirical part, we shall consider a model where the dependent variable will bequalitative, a fact that raises speci c econometric problems discussed in the paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we summarize the main features of the model we consider. Section 3 provides restrictions on compensation dynamics which lead to a testable property of the wage process. A brief description of the data|a sample of 1058 executives of a large french state-owned rm|is given in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the econometric model, whose estimation results are presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 considers some alternative explanations for the late beginner e ect. The class of models for which our approach is relevant i s c haracterized by t wo features. On the one hand, the labor relationship entails learning. Information is incomplete at the beginning, and gradually revealed through time. As a consequence, the employer has, at each period, some beliefs upon the worker's ability, and these beliefs are relevant for the wage process. On the other hand, the wage process exhibits a downward rigidity property; i.e., the wage at date t must depend on the employer's beliefs, but also be bounded below b y some function of the wage at date t , 1.
These two requirements can beformalized as follows.
Learning
Our representation of the learning process exactly follows that of HarrisHolmstrom 1982 in their seminal paper. Information is incomplete but symmetric between the employer and the employees. To capture this feature, it is assumed that each employee i is characterized, besides observable variables education. . . , by a scalar ability index i . At the beginning of the relationship, the worker's ability is unknown to both parties. They only know the distribution from which i is drawn; we assume this is normal.
During the relationship, both parties learn symmetrically about i . Speci cally, at each period t, the employee's performance y i t is publicly revealed. Performance is a noisy function of the employee's ability:
Assumption 1 Performance at date t is given by : y i t = i + " i t where the " i t are iid normal centered random shocks.
Given the current observation, both parties revise their perception of the worker's ability i n a B a yesian way; we call m i t the posterior beliefs at date t. Note that m i t only depends on the prior distribution, on the one hand, and on the empirical average of past performances on the other hand. Also, one may assume, without loss of generality, that the outcome generated for the employer by the worker is equal to y i t ; hence i is the unconditional expected 5 revenue the employer receives at each period, while m i t is the expected revenue conditional on past performances. A basic property of this setting, that will becrucial in the following, is given by the following easy Lemma:
Lemma A few comments are in order. Note, rst, that wages are assumed to actually depend on current beliefs. The intuition relates to a kind of nocommitment assumption for the worker. If, as is standard, one assumes that workers are always free to quit, then the salary received by good"workers must be high enough to match the potential o ers from other employers. The natural translation is in term of a minimum: f o r a w orker with a given reputation" m i t , the wage must beset above some increasing function ' t m i t . Note that this argument implicitly assumes that m i t is publicly observable 2 .
2 For a more complex information setting, see for instance Ricart i Costa 1988.
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The rigidity ingredient, on the other hand, is introduced by the term t w i t,1 in the max operator: even a very poorperformance cannot drive the current w age below a given function of the past wage. Such a d o wnward rigidity property is a standard nding of the empirical literature; labor sociologists, in particular, have provided empirical evidence of this e ect. Recently, Bewley 1997, after many interviews with heads and top managers of private rms, has emphasized the feeling of insult" that agents associate with a decrease in their nominal wages; this argument is put forth by almost all executives interviewed by Bewley to explain, in particular, why wages could not belowered even during recessions. On the theory side, this assumption can bejusti ed in various ways: risk-sharing, incomplete contracts. . . Two speci c examples are described in the next subsection.
Finally, t is some non-insurable random shock. One may think of t as a rm-speci c demand shock, or as stemming from some bargaining process with unions. An alternative interpretation of t is as a general in ationary shock. In particular, the formulation in ?? is compatible with the nding by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 1994b that, although nominal wages are rigid downwards, real wages need not be in general.
Examples
Several models that have been developed in the literature provide illustrations of our general framework.
The Harris-Holmstrom Model
A rst illustration is provided by the model of insurance and Bayesian learning proposed by Harris-Holmstrom 1982. In this framework, the employer is risk neutral, while the worker is risk averse, and it is assumed that no insurance company covers productivity risks. Wage contracts are then used to share the risk in an optimal way, under the constraint that the employee is always free to quit. The learning process is as above; and since commitment is unilateral, the expected value of future pro ts, conditional on perceived ability a t that time, must benon positive a t e a c h period.
The solution of the model displays the required downwards rigidity feature; speci cally: Proposition 2 Harris-Holmstrom 1982 The explanation is that, since information is symmetric, the worker will be insured not only against the random shocks, but also against the risk of being a poor performer having a low . Thus, at the optimum, no observation can result in wages being lowered. Actually, should commitment be bilateral, the contract would provide full insurance, i.e., constant wages independently of performances. Here, however, insurance can only bepartial, because of the no-commitment constraint on the worker's side. At each period, the worker must face a present value of future expected wages at least equal to the expected pro t she will generate. The term ' t m i t represents precisely the market value of the employee, as determined by present beliefs about her ability. Clearly, ?? is a particular case of ??, while Bayesian updating satis es Lemma 1. So the Harris-Holmstrom model does t into our general framework.
Incomplete Contracts and E cient Investments: Avoiding
Hold-ups"
In the Harris-Holmstrom paper, wage rigidity results from an insurance motive. However, other explanations can be found in the literature. In a recent paper, McLeod and Malcomson 1993 reexamine the hold-up problems raised by incomplete contracting in a buyer-seller relationship where unveriable investments are required. Their main insight is that the contract cannot generate e cient i n vestment unless the investor receives the full marginal returns on investment, taking into account a n y subsequent renegotiation. The authors exhibit simple contracts that achieve this in various settings. Most relevant to us is their section VII, in which they consider a multiperiod model with general investments and a cost of switching partners. They show that in this model, what they call a xed-price contract then induces e cient investments. This contract takes the following form, after renegotiation: p t = minmaxp t,1 ; p S t ; p B t where p B t resp. p S t makes the buyer's resp. the seller's outside option bind see Figure 1 in McLeod-Malcomson. In our case, the buyer is the employer, the seller is the worker and p is the wage. Now assume that the employer's outside option never binds. Then, while McLeod and Malcomson's approach is much more abstract than ours, the properties of their solution exhibit the type of rigidity that we assume in Assumption 2. If moreover the worker's outside option is generated by learning and outside o ers, then we are back within the LDR model.
The In uence of Early Performances
In this section, we investigate the speci c properties of the wage paths under assumptions 1 and 2. More precisely, we are interested in the memory properties of the model: how does the wage at any date depend on previous performances, and which serial correlation properties of wage schedules obtain as a result? Some properties are somewhat obvious. For instance, it can readily be showed that, given the learning process we consider, wages should exhibit the so-called fast track" e ect: a good start that is, a high wage in the rst periods generally signals a good future career. Or, to put it in a slightly more technical way: the wage at date t + 1 is always positively correlated with the wage at date t, and, as a matter of fact, with the wage at any date t , s, s 0. Note, however, that this is true only for unconditional distributions: the correlation of the wage at date t + 1 with the wage at date, say, t , 1, once we also condition on the wage at date t is much more complex, and will be discussed in detail below.
A second remark is that, in such a setting, the wage contract bridges performances over time in a non commutative way; that is, a permutation on the order in which performances occur will in general modify the nal wage. The intuition, here, is that downwards rigidity generates a ratchet" e ect : whenever a given level of wage has been reached, future wages will never go below a function of this level, whatever future performances may b e . This property introduces nonlinear memory within the wage process: it is always better to perform well in the rst period, because any wage increase that may result from a good"initial sequence of performances cannot be fully o set by future failures, however serious the latter may b e .
This intuition can be formalized as follows. Forgetting the i index for the moment, we may rst note that, following Assumptions 1 and 2, wages will This corollary expresses that, for a given set of realized performances fy 1 ; :::; y T g, the order is important, in the sense that it is better to perform well soon. Speci cally, any permutation such that a better performance occurs sooner increases the agent's wage pro le. Though the result, in full generality, m a y hold with equality, this need not be the case. In fact, it is easy to construct robust examples where, from period i on, w t is always strictly greater than w 0 t . The interpretation is clear. If initial performances are very good, the wage reached at period j , 1 will be so high that the ratchet e ect will constantly operate in the following; the result being that the worker's wage will always exceed what external competition would require, given the existing beliefs about his ability.
Testable Properties of the Wage Process: The Late Beginner E ect
We n o w show that the previous properties imply interesting testable properties of the optimal wage path.
To grasp the intuition, assume that two workers start at date 0 with identical observable characteristics, so that they receive the same rst-period wage. Then, because of disparities in performances due to di erences in abilities, luck, or both, their wages at period 1 di er; say, A's wage is higher w A 1 w B 1 . Finally, assume that second period performances are such that, at period 2, their wages again are equal. Which w orker will in expectation have the better career in the future?
In this framework, the answer is clear and is given by the following:
Proposition The intuition can be summarized as follows. Consider B's performance pro le. We know that B's rst performance was less goodthan A's. Also, we know that the order of occurrence matters, and that starting with a bad result is a handicap. But B has still been able to catch up at period 2. This can only be the case if her average performance over the two periods has been at least as good as|and possibly strictly better than|A's. In the former case, then perceived abilities, hence expected career pro les, are identical. In the latter case, A's perceived ability i s l o wer than B's; since future prospects only depend on wage and perceived ability at period 2, we conclude that B is strictly better o on average than A. The latter case is illustrated in Figure 1 . Note that the conclusion only relies upon Lemma 1; it applies to any learning process that ful lls the latter property.
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The above properties are quite interesting for empirical purposes. The fact that the conditional expectation is increasing in w i 2 , on the one hand, is not surprising. That higher wages today indicate higher wages tomorrow is a natural property, implied by a bunch of di erent models. The key result, on the other hand, is the fact that, keeping w i 2 constant, the conditional expectation is decreasing in w i 1 . This property, to the best of our knowledge, has not been derived so far as a consequence of any of the existing alternative models of wage formation. For instance, in a repeated moral hazard framework, assuming free access to nancial markets and constant absolute risk aversion 3 , theory shows that optimal incentives are memoryless; poor performance today should result in lower wages tomorrow, but should then be forgotten in the future see Fudenberg-Holmstrom-Milgrom 1990, and Chiappori-Macho-Rey-Salani e 1994 for a general presentation.
3 Models where agents cannot access a nancial market i.e., cannot save are not relevant for the present situation. Moreover, free access to nancial markets with general preferences generates very complex contracts if the latter are to be renegotiation proof in particular, e ort and savings may have to be randomized. See Chiappori-Macho-ReySalani e 1994 for a detailed discussion. 13 2.5 Testing for the Late Beginner E ect A nice feature of the result described above is that it characterizes the intrinsic dynamics of wages, independently of the underlying performances. As a consequence, it can betested even in the absence of any data on workers' behavior|a property that is especially attractive in view of the di culties described in our Introduction. The test, by itself, is very simple. Write down expected wages at date t + 1 as a function of observables age, education. . . and of both wages at date t and t , 1 . Then the impact of the latter should befound negative. Such a test can beperformed on any data set where wages are observable.
This optimistic claim should however be quali ed. The basic assumption, indeed, is that observed wages exactly and exclusively re ect perceived ability plus possibly last period wages through rigidity. This assumption, natural as it may seem within a simple theoretical framework, may or may not berelevant in a more realistic setting. In many cases, wages do not immediately respond to changes in perceived ability. While higher wages are, globally, correlated with higher average performances, the wage formation process entails more complex features, such as discrete promotions within a predetermined hierarchical structure. This is not only an empirical fact that has been repeatedly documented; various theoretical arguments have been developed to explain it. An important strand of the literature on labor contracts, for instance, emphasizes the role of tournaments in the wage setting process. In such a context, wage increases actually take the form of discontinuous jumps, often linked with a promotion to a higher level in the hierarchy. Tournaments, in turn, are relevant i n v arious situations. A case studied, for instance, by Green and Stokey 1983 , is when individual performances are a ected by some common, random shock. Then relative performances are a better indicator of the agent's ability or e ort, in a moral hazard context than absolute individual performances 4 . Another argument, provided by Malcomson 1984 , relies upon the existence of moral hazard on the employer's side. In general, the performance" of the worker cannot bemeasured in any objective manner; it is estimated through some monitoring process that entails the subjective appreciation of a supervisor. Obviously, this scheme is manipulable; a supervisor can always, ex post, underdeclare the performance in order to minimize the wage increase. In this incomplete contracting context, promotions provide a simple but e cient commitment device. The employer can commit upon the numberof promotions for a given group, and this is easily contractible.
This mechanism is especially relevant in our case. Indeed, the existence of a rigid hierarchical structure, where wage increases systematically take the form of promotion to some superior level, is a well known characteristic of so-called internal labor markets" 5 . Another characteristic is the fact that, within such mechanism, ows of workers from and to the economic environment are particularly small. This speci c feature, we believe, is of special interest in our case. Though the relevance of the LDR framework is general, one may argue that the details of the modelization t the speci c context of internal labor markets especially well. In particular, other potential employers are considered only insofar as they provide outside opportunities that the agent m a y and does use in the bargaining process. The competition between employers to attract workers is not explicitly considered, and would imply a numberof additional features. While this limitation does not raise speci c problem for internal labor markets, it would in the context of an open" organization 6 .
Of course, testing the late beginner property on internal labor markets raises speci c di culties. The main one is that, in this context, wages do not have the same information content as implicitly postulated in the model. They are essentially determined by the hierarchical level and seniority, according to some explicit formula that has generally been negotiated with unions. In most cases, in fact, the data les used by the rms for the management of labor resources do not even include wages this is for instance the case for the data we use in the empirical part. The latter, indeed, can readily be computed from other data available in the le, such as hierarchical level and seniority within the rm and within the job level; the computation being performed by a separate program, using a formula that is discussed with unions. This does not mean that wages are uncorrelated with ability, but rather that the key information is given by the job level|or, in other words, that the dynamics of wages should be understood as a discrete process within the hierarchical structure.
The question, now, is whether the late beginner property described above can be tested with such data. In the remainder of the section, we argue that the answer is positive, and describe two possible ways of performing this task.
Desired versus actual wages A rst solution is to assume that the previous setting is still relevant in principle, but that w t should beunderstood as desired" wages; and that, because of some additional constraint say, moral hazard on the employer's side, actual wages cannot coincide with desired wages. The consequence is a dual structure. Actual wages, on the one hand, depend on the hierarchical level, which is observable, according to some mechanism involving other observables such as seniority, education. . . ; but, as argued above, this is not of direct interest for our purpose. The dynamics of desired wages, on the other hand, are characterized by the same equations as in the theoretical model above; in particular, they should, accordingly, exhibit the late beginner e ect. But desired wages are not directly observable from the data; what is observed is the hierarchical level, S t , that belongs to some nite set = fS 0 ; :::; S k g 7 . The latter can beseen as a discretization of the desired wage, in the sense that there exist thresholds s 1 t ; :::; s k t such that:
S t = S j , s j t w t s j+1 t 7 Now, although desired wages are not observed, the dynamics of promotions, as recorded in the data, exactly re ects that of desired wages; we can try to estimate the latter from the induced promotion dynamics. Once this goal has been reached, testing the late beginner e ect amounts to testing that : @ @w t,1 E w t+1 j w t ; w t,1 ; X 0 where X denotes a v ector of observables.
The main problem, in this approach, is to recover the dynamics of desired wages from that of promotions. This will beour rst task in the empirical sections below.
The dynamics of promotions An alternative approach, that follows from Waldman 1984 and Ricart i Costa 1988, is to directly derive, from the setting above, predictions upon the promotion mechanism. Assume again that agents, at any date t, can be assigned a level within some nite set = fS 0 ; :::; S k g. Each level corresponds to some speci c task; in addition, tasks are increasingly demanding, in the sense that a worker's productivity is highest in the low job when the worker's expected ability is in a low range, highest in the middle job when the worker's expected ability is in a middle range, and so on. Since, within our learning context, ability cannot be directly observed, but is proxied by average performance, the technical translation of this is the following: there exists thresholds s 1 t ; :::; s k t such that S t = S j , s j t m t = y 1 + ::: + y t t s j+1 t Finally, the downward rigidity property can bedirectly translated in terms of job levels by imposing that S t S t,1 for all t.
What kind of prediction can be made upon the promotion process within this setting? In particular, can we expect the late beginner e ect to hold true in this context? Unfortunately, the answer is not always positive. To understand why, consider again the situation depicted in Figure 1 , but with a slightly di erent i n terpretation. Here, A was promoted to S 1 at the end of period 1, whereas B remained at the initial level S 0 . After period 2, however, A is still at S 1 , and so is B, who has been able to catch up. Now, what are the respective prospects for their future careers?
The key point is that Proposition 3 is valid when it is possible to condition on the exact value of the wage at period 2. By continuity, it still holds when the latter is known with a small enough uncertainty|i.e., when the interval s 1 2 ; s 2 2 ; corresponding to level 2, is narrow enough. When it is too large, however, the result need not hold. This suggests that the late beginner e ect is more likely to be satis ed when i the lower threshold s 1 2 is high enough, and ii the upper threshold s 2 2 is low enough.
This claim can be made more precise in the following way. Indeed, in this case, the value of y B 1 + y B 2 is known. Then it is a su cient statistic for B's past performance, and it is known to be higher than the corresponding value for A. Actually, the result is a direct consequence of Proposition 3, since, as it can readily bechecked, the latter applies to this case.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. Assume, rst, that all agents are automatically promoted to level 1 at the end of period 2 this corresponds to s 1 2 = ,1. Then being a late beginner does not convey any information, except for the fact that the rst performance has been poor.
Consequently, expectations will be quite low. In the opposite polar case, being promoted to level 1 at the end of period 2 is extremely di cult, and requires a very goodaverage performance|very close, as a matter of fact, to what would be required for direct promotion to level 2, which is precisely what A failed to do. Being a late beginner, then, is a quite favorable signal. On the contrary, the fact that A remained at the same level may be due to good although not excellent performances; but it may, alternatively, beentirely due to downward rigidity, in spite of a very poorsecond period performance. The previous argument then applies: B is likely to perform better in the future.
A similar remark also applies to the upper threshold s 2 2 . The story goes as follows. Note rst that, in our initial model, a better start is always, unconditionally, a signal of higher ability. Agents who start fast and continue at the same pace the champions" are likely to be the most productive overall. On the contrary, the early starters, according to our de nition, are those who started well but experienced a slowdown at the next stage. It is crucial, for the empirical applications, to be able to distinguish between these two categories. This is precisely the interpretation of the threshold s 2 2 ; early starters are characterized by the fact that their average performance, at the end of period 2, is not very good|technically, it remains below this threshold. Now, consider, as a third polar case, the situation where s 2 2 is very high|say, + 1, so that both champions and early starters are gathered in the same class. Then Proposition 3 does not apply, and the late beginner e ect will not hold. The intuition, again, is clear. A's failure to be promoted at the end of period 2 has absolutely no informational content, since promotion was basically out of reach b y that time, whatever the performance. The only di erence between A and B is that, while they both reached the same level, A did it earlier. Then the odds probably favor A.
The conclusion is that the late beginner e ect is likely to hold when a promotion to level 2 is frequent enough, so that non promotion from level 1 to level 2 signals a relatively weak average performance. Empirically, this will raise problems for the relevant de nition of the periods" under consideration. If period 2 is taken to bevery short, early starters are not singled out from champions, which will contradict the late beginner e ect. But, conversely, if it is too long, then basically everybody will have been promoted at level 1 b y that time, which also weakens the prediction. We shall discuss this aspect in more detail within the empirical section.
Finally, it should beemphasized that the two approaches just described are not exclusive. The interpretation in term of desired wages" is fully compatible with the conclusions in term of promotions; the two points of views provide di erent but complementary empirical tests. On the one hand, from the data on promotions, one can recover the implicit dynamics of desired wages, and check for the negative impact of wages at t,1 on wages at date t + 1, controlling for wages at date t. On the other hand, the model, once estimated, allows to compute the promotion probabilities conditionally on observables. The latter lead to a test of the kind described just above; in addition, they can be compared to actual frequencies, which provides an interesting speci cation test. This is the path we follow in the empirical sections below.
The Data
We n o w turn to the empirical part of the paper. The dataset we use describes the career pro les of a sample of 1058 executives in a large french state-owned rm from 1960 to 1982 8 .
This rm presents all the internal labor market attributes as listed by Doeringer-Piore 1971: all executives enter the rm at the same hierarchical level; almost all jobs are lled by internal promotion and quits and lay-o are exceptions.
Wage setting Wages are determined as a function of job level and seniority. Speci cally, there is an explicit formula, publicly announced, that de nes the wage of a given agent as a function of i his seniority, ii his hierarchical level, and iii a general coe cient A t , identical for all executives, and reecting the general evolution of purchasing power; in general, A t is bargained over with the unions. Technically, the internal rules of the rm indicate the following way of computing wages: S t = K i t :A t 8
8 For a rst investigation on the same data, see Bourguignon and Chiappori 1990. 20 Here, K i t is the wage, as expressed in some internal num eraire called points"; then ?? translates the internal numeraire into Francs, using the coe cient A t . The value of K i t , in turn, is given by:
where :
L i is a coe cient speci c to the hierachical level i t only depends on the employee's seniority within the rm k i t only depends on the employee's seniority within his curent hierarchical level Apparently, this formula was strictly applied. As a matter of fact, the les we received did not indicate the wage level at all. When we asked for them, the answer was that they could be computed from the formula; we were given a complementary le with the historical values of the coe cient A t over the whole period.
The conclusion is that in this organization, as in most internal labor markets, wage changes either re ect seniority rules or translate promotion decisions into monetary terms. The key steps of a career, in particular, appear to bethe transitions between the di erent hierarchical levels. Indeed, the analysis of hazard rates by hierarchical level displays no consistent administrative policy. Thus we consider promotion as the relevant reward that conveys the employer's view of the worker's ability 9 .
Observables The data set contains biographical information, such as date of birth and diploma, and the promotion history, as recorded each year between 1960 and 1982. Our sample is restricted to agents entering the rm between 1960 and 1967; as a consequence, we observe the career of each of them for at least 15 years.
In the following, we focus on two observable characteristics which are correlated with ability at time of entry, namely initial training and age at entry. As a matter of fact, the executives of the sample form a remarkably homogenous population. They are predominantly men 98. Race is not recorded French l a w forbids that; neither are citizenship or geographic origin. None of these variables is likely to a ect promotion for executives in any case. Initial training also is quite homogenous, in the sense that all 1058 executives of the sample graduated with a masters of engineering and entered the rm almost immediately. In France, however, not all masters of engineering are equally recognized. A crucial di erence, for instance, is between Grandes Ecoles" 10 and alternative university programs that deliver an equivalent degree. In addition, there is also an important dispersion between the Grandes Ecoles". Following most empirical work on similar data, we divided the sample into two classes: the best-known Grandes Ecoles" and the other diplomas. One can observe this dispersion when looking at the total number of promotions a worker gets at the end of the rst fteen years in the rm. Figure 2 displays the percentage of the sample who obtained from one to six promotions at the end of the period of observation.
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The other explanatory variable is the age at entry in the rm. The distribution of the age at entry is given in Figure 3 .
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De ning the periods The late beginner property involves three subperiods, so we will need to split the data accordingly. This, of course, is an important part of the empirical work, since it relates to the construction of the speci c data set on which the late beginner e ect will be tested for.
During their careers, the executives are promoted along a xed hierarchical scheme. Concerning the rst fteen years, four levels of the scale are in fact relevant; they are classi ed as 10, 11, 12 and 13. Every worker starts at the bottom of level 10 in his rst year of employment. All but a very small minority less than 3 are at level 13 or below after fteen years. So the rst promotion we consider that may or may not occur during period 1 is from level 10 to level 11. Among those promoted early to level 11, some the champions" are then promoted to level 12 during the next period, whereas others our early starters" are not. Also, among the rest, some our late beginners" are promoted to level 11 or even to level 12 during the second period, while others are not. Finally, we can consider later promotions to level 13 or above during the last period.
The next step is to precisely de ne the periods. Our raw data set span the rst fteen years of every worker's career. Thus, a priori there is a lot of leeway to break the fteen years into three periods. The end of the third period will be the end of the last year. But when should the rst and second periods end?
A basic guideline is suggested by the conclusions of the theory section. On the one hand, each period must be long enough for promotions to happen often enough, so that the downward rigidity phenomenon has time to appear and, incidentally, that the samples are of su cient size for the empirical conclusions to be statistically signi cant. On the other hand, during longer periods, most workers will be promoted, and promotion may lose most of its information content, as discussed above. This remark is especially important in the case of period 2. We want the numberof promotions from level 11 to level 12 to be non negligible, in order to distinguish our early starters from the best performers overall the champions". There is, however, a price to pay for that: promotions from level 10 to level 11 may then concern a majority o f the agents at stake, which somewhat blurs the distinction between our late beginners and the worst performers overall. The nature of this trade-o is essentially empirical; a closer look at the data is needed at this point.
A key empirical element to beconsidered, hence, is the promotion probability per year at each level. Figure 4 indicates, for each possible tenure, the percentage of the total population at each level. These are descriptive statistics; no correction has been made for truncation. Let us rst consider level 10. Less than one fourth of the sample was promoted before year 3; conversely, almost 90 had been promoted at year 5. This strongly suggests that the rst period should last 3 or 4 years.
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Let us now consider the second period. After 6 years, only 10 of the total population has been promoted to level 12; the corresponding agents are almost exclusively champions", i.e., agents following the fast tracks. Period 2, hence, should at least end at year 7, and preferably 8 or 9. Going beyond 9, on the other hand, is excluded, because the population remaining at level 10 after that date is too small about 1 of the population.
The conclusion is that, given the requirements previously described, period 1 can reasonably betaken to end 3 or 4 years after entering the rm, whereas for period two years 7, 8 or 9 seem acceptable. In the descriptive statistics section below, we consider the various combinations and indicate their consequences. As for the econometric estimation, on the other hand, we select the intermediate de nitions, i.e., respectively 4 y ears and 8 y ears.
In each case, we de ne Y 1 = 1 if the worker was promoted to level 11 in the rst period Y 1 = 0 otherwise Y 2 = 2 if the worker was promoted to level 12 during the rst two periods Y 2 = 1 if the worker was promoted to level 11 but not to level 12 during the rst two periods Y 2 = 0 otherwise Y 3 = 3 if the worker was promoted to level 13 or above before the end of the 15 years Y 3 = 2 otherwise.
Finally, our explanatory variables X i refer to age and education. These are dichotomic variables. The variable X i 1 takes the value 1 when worker i has a diploma from one of the top Grandes Ecoles" and 0 otherwise. X i the resulting four categories. In order to control for possible changes during the period, we also added a third dummy variable that takes the value one for employees who were hired after 1964 the midpoint i n t h e sample.
Descriptive Statistics
Given our data, it is easy to test the late beginner e ect using only descriptive statistics. For any given de nition of periods, denote p ijk the true probability that a worker has the promotion path Y 1 = i; Y 2 = j; Y 3 = k and N ijk the numb e r o f s u c h w orkers in our dataset. Then early starters are clearly those for which Y 1 = Y 2 = 1, so that their conditional promotion probability i n t h e third period is p 113 =p 11 . On the other hand, there are two possible ways to de ne the late beginners. The rst one consists in selecting those workers for which Y 1 = 0 and Y 2 = 1 . Then the late beginner e ect translates, in terms of conditional promotion probabilities, into p 013 p 01 p 113 p 11 Let us call this inequality I1. The conditional probabilities on both sides of the inequality can beestimated by their empirical analogs N 013 =N 01 and N 113 =N 11 ; the standard errors of these estimators follow by assuming a binomial process, and nally we can compute the Student of the di erence of the two conditional probabilities if we make the further natural assumption that their estimators are independent.
To illustrate this, we use the whole sample of 1058 executives, and consider various possible de nitions for the rst two periods. In each case, we estimate the ratios N 013 =N 01 and N 113 =N 11 and the Student of the di erence. The results are given in Table 2 Table 2 : promotion probabilities for early starters and late beginners using I1
When the second period ends 8 or 9 years after entry, the comparison of conditional promotion probabilities is consistent with our prediction: late beginners are more likely to reach the top than early starters. It is not the case, however, when the second period is shorter i.e., 7 years. Seven years may not belong enough for downward rigidity t o operate, as argued above. In any case, the di erences are not statistically signi cant.
These results, however, are somewhat biased by the fact that at the end of the second period, some of the late beginners are already at the next level i.e., level 12; this corresponds to Y 1 = 0 and Y 2 = 2. These are not taken into account in the above statistics. Still, they provide an even better illustration of our late beginner e ect: typically, their ability is high, although they have been especially unlucky during the rst period. Table 3 presents the promotion probabilities when this particular subsample is added to the late beginner population so that the conditional promotion probability of late beginners now is de ned as p 013 Table 3 : promotion probabilities for early starters and late beginners using I2
Now the di erences of probabilities are always of the predicted sign; in addition, for t 2 = 8 and t 2 = 9 ; they are highly signi cant. This suggests that the predictions of the theoretical model deserves more precise consideration. In the next section, we impose more structure upon the data generating process in order to reach sharper results.
The econometric model
Our general strategy, in this section, is the one described at the end of Section 2. We rst specify a desired wage formation equation, that can be estimated from our promotion data. A rst test concerns the predicted negative correlation between wages at dates 1 and 3. Then, using the estimated model, we can estimate the conditional promotion probabilities and directly check the late beginner e ect.
The rst task, hence, is to specify the equations for the desired wages w t . We proceed as follows. First, we substract the e ect of observables:
where is a set of time-invariant parameters to beestimated. Second, conditionally on observables, the rst period desired wage should depend on the realization of the rst period performance: where, by construction, 2 is independent from u and 1 , and 3 is independent from u; 1 and 2 .
The prediction to be tested is that 2 0; 3 0 and 3 0. Given that we will use a trivariate Probit model, there is little we can do to estimate the variances of the disturbances. Thus we normalize the variances of u + 1 and u + 2 to one. This decomposes into V u = and V 1 = V 2 = 1 , . Note that is a crucial parameter, as it represents the variance of the random xed e ect, and thus what is to be learned about the worker's ability. On the other hand, since the third period is longer than each of the rst two periods, we allow for a di erent v ariance for 3 : V 3 = v 3 1 , , so that both and v 3 are to be estimated.
Finally, we only observe the job level, interpreted as a discretization of the desired wage. Our dependent variables, hence, are de ned as: Y 1 = 1 i f w 1 s 1 1 ; 0 otherwise 13 Y 2 = 2 i f w 2 s 2 2 ; 1 i f s 1 2 w 2 s 2 2 ; 0 otherwise Y 3 = 3 i f W 3 s 3 3 ; 0 otherwise 28 with only one proviso due to downwards rigidity: since there are no demotions in the sample, we code Y 2 =1 whenever Y 1 = 1 and w 2 s 1 2 .
Our model is de ned by ?? and ??, plus the requirement that u, 1 , 2 and 3 are normal centered and independently distributed, with the variances given above. The constants c i and i cannot beestimated independantly of the thresholds, so that we w on't try to interpret them. There are eight other parameters to be estimated: three in , 2 , 3 , 3 , and v 3 .
We are now ready to write our trivariate Probit model. Note that because of the coe cients 2 , 3 and 3 and the correlation structure they induce among w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 , the model does not decompose across periods: it is formally similar to a Probit model on panel data with serial correlation. The computation of the probabilities p i jkl is tedious but simple. Take for instance the probability p i 002 that worker i is never promoted. This is just the probability that All left-hand terms in this system of inequalities are normal centered and it is easy to compute their variance-covariance matrix, so that p i 002 is easily expressed using 3 , the cumulative distribution function of a trivariate normal vector with zero mean, unit variance and arbitrary correlations. The function CDFTVN of the GAUSS software is a very accurate if somewhat slow implementation of the trivariate normal cumulative distribution function 3 .
It is readily checked that the likelihood function depends on exactly 8 parameters discarding the constants, so that the model is just identi ed. While the expression for L N looks forbidding, it can be computed and maximized fairly easily with GAUSS. This yields consistent and asymptotically e cient estimators N of the parameter vector = ; 2 ; 3 ; 3 ; ; v 3 Their asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is consistently estimated byÎ ,1 , whereÎ is the outer product of the scores 
These estimators can betested for the theoretical restrictions on 2 , 3 and 3 ; they also will give us immediately the conditional probabilities of promotion at the third period that we are most interested in.
The results
Maximizing the log-likelihood yielded the estimates 11 contained in Table 4 . The algorithm converged without di culty 12 .
First note that a high-level diploma increases the probability of a promotion; as expected, this e ect is strongly signi cant. Age at recruitment also appears to have a positive e ect on perceived ability; again, anecdotal evidence seems to con rm this. The value of 3 suggests either that the quality of newly hired executives improved slightly after 1964, or that demand factors created better opportunities from that date on. More interestingly, which we called inequality I1. Of course, these probabilities here depend on the individual through his age,education, year of entry characteristics. Table 5 shows that the hypothesis is indeed con rmed for all ages, education levels and subperiod of entry. We also computed the estimated standard errors of p 013 =p 01 ,p 113 =p 11 , using Slutsky's theorem. In each case, the late beginner e ect is satis ed, although the estimated Student t in the last column of Table 5 shows that the di erence is never statistically signi cant at the conventional 5 level.
It turns out that our second way to test the late beginner e ect using inequality I2 yields similar but much more clearcut results. Recall that in this test, we also consider those who were not promoted in the rst period but were promoted twice in the second period as late beginners, so that the conditional promotion probability of late beginners now i s p 013 +p 023 =p 01 + p 02 . The results are given in Table 6 . Again, the late beginner e ect is con rmed for all values of the observables; but this time the di erence always is statistically signi cant.
Thus Table 5 and especially Table 6 systematically back the hypothesis that late beginners" are favored in the third period, which we derived as an implication of the LDR model. This clearly suggests that learning about innate abilities is a strongly relevant factor in determining career pro les. It also emphasizes the surprising predictive power of such a simple model as that in LDR.
It is di cult to invent a speci cation test, as no simple and attractive alternative speci cation comes to mind. However, it is easy to look at the t of the model by comparing the promotion paths simulated from the estimated models and those found in the actual sample. This is done in Table 7 . The results show that simple as it is, our model predicts promotion paths very accurately. The rst goal of the paper was to show h o w the dynamical consequences of a wage contracting model can lead to testable restrictions upon career pro les. We identi ed a class of models that generate a late beginner" property. Our empirical results con rm this prediction, as we nd that late beginners are systematically favored in future promotion decisions. A natural question, at this point, is whether other types of models would also predict a late beginner" type of e ect. We shall brie y review a few candidates, and indicate which empirical consideration could be used to distinguish them from the LDR class of models.
Let us rst deal brie y with the rst two alternative explanations. The rst one rests on the famous Peter Principle, which holds that every worker is promoted up to his level of incompetence. The trouble with this approach is that it nds it di cult to account for the careers of the late beginners, whose career stagnates and then accelerates. The second one holds that recent performance could be a better indicator of future success because future work is more closely related to recent than to past work. This would ignore the fact that, in our framework, early starters and late beginners were not employed at the same task at the beginning of the rst period; in fact, early starters were employed at a higher job level.
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We now consider in more detail two other possible stories.
Human capital accumulation
A rst, and very natural explanation of the late beginner e ect would rely upon human capital accumulation HCA, following a line suggested by Mincer 1974 . Assume that agents di er by their willingness and or ability to accumulate human capital. Some of them will choose a high-accumulation strategy. In a rst stage, this results in lower wages, since part of their e ort is devoted to investment rather than production. But, at the same time, their capital stock increases quickly. After some time, their productivity will beboosted by the returns of their capital; wages will then raise at a much faster pace. Now consider the agents who adopted a low-accumulation prole. Their wage pro le will start with a relatively steeper slope; but this slope will remain more or less constant -or, at least, increase in a much slower way. Eventually, agents of the rst category will typically exhibit a late beginner" pro le; and the model predicts they will end up with higher wages, just as in the LDR framework.
There exists, however, some clear-cut predictions that allow to distinguish between the HCA explanation and our framework. The basic idea is straightforward. In the HCA case, agents whose career starts fast accumulate little human capital, and this lowers their future wages. On the other hand, it is easy to check that in the LDR model, a good start is interpreted as a signal of a high innate ability, hence predicts high future wages. This remarks suggests a v ery simple test: is it true that, unconditionnally, a slow start leads to better careers than a quick one?
Two types of evidence can beput forth to answer this question. For one thing, we can consider the subset of agents who turned out to bethe most successful, and see what their initial wage pro le looked like. Our data clearly favour the LDR interpretation. For instance, among the 517 agents out of 1058 who reached the top levels in the third period, only 140 i.e., 27 were not promoted during the rst period our de nition of a slow start". This feature appears to be fairly robust: a slow start is, unconditionally, correlated with a lower terminal position. This is of course very well-known in the literature, where it is called the fast track" e ect, so that there is little need to insist on it. Going forward this time, we can test whether a slow start is, unconditionally, correlated with a higher terminal position. The answer is clearly negative. For instance, 21 of those with a relatively fast start eventually made it to job level 13 N 113 =N 11 = 0 :21, while nobody with a slow start did N 003 is zero. Restricting attention to two periods only does not change this conclusion; for instance, we nd that N 12 N 1 = :71 : 19 = N 02 N 0 and the di erence is highly signi cant the Student of the di erence is 9.9.
We conclude that the HCA explanation can be rejected. It should be stressed, however, that this conclusion does not imply that agents do not accumulate human capital, but simply that di erences in the respective rates of human capital accumulation do not seem to provide a convincing explanation of the late beginner e ect, at least for our data set.
Autocorrelated individual productivity
A second possible explanation relies upon speci c properties of the dynamics of individual productivity. Assume that wages are directly linked to productivity| say, w i t = i t , where i t denotes i's productivity at date t and where is increasing. Also, assume that productivity follows some AR2 process : This, quite obviously, would lead to exactly the kind of e ect we get in our model. This suggests a couple of remarks: a formulation like ?? is both more speci c and more ad hoc than our setting. The key point|the negative correlation between i t and i t,2 keeping i t,1 constant|has to bepostulated, rather than derived from a set of theoretical assumptions. Also, while autocorrelation of productivity shocks may sound like an acceptable assumption, it may be more di cult to understand why productivity changes should be positively correlated. Note, incidentally, that the AR2 structure is needed; an AR1 process would not produce a late beginner e ect. in principle, the existence of an AR2 structure with a negative is a testable assumption. Unfortunately, in our case, this test is di cult to achieve, because of the discrete nature of our data. In any case, it would require more than three periods, which would add further di culties for the estimation. Data on wages, such as those used by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom 1994a,b would be more adequate. Obviously, further research is needed in this area.
